This paper proposes a two-parameter family of socio-economic health inequality indices. First, these indices allow a Boolean risk factor to be linked to other health dimensions. Second, multidimensional health distributions can be compared thanks to a stochastic dominance rule, which includes the attitude of the social planner with respect to the risk factor (risk neutrality, risk aversion and extreme risk aversion). Third, each order of stochastic dominance is also associated with the intensity of possible health transfers occurring between individuals, that is, the degree of inequality aversion of the social planner. This approach is a multidimensional extension of Yitzhaki's Gini indices accounting simultaneously for risk and redistribution.
Introduction
The measurement of socio-economic health inequalities has mainly been studied according to the well-known concentration indices. These concentration indices were first handled because of their simple interpretations and also for their econometric properties -see for instance Kakwani, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997) . They are also commonly employed since, following Yitzhaki (1983) , concentration indices are relevant for a given degree of inequality aversion supported by the decision maker.
In the case of socio-economic health inequality indices, a first line of research demonstrates the necessity of employing several decomposable indices. In the framework of unidimensional indicators of health, Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Watanabe (2003) show that socio-economic health inequality indices are decomposable into the contribution of different explicative factors such as the levels of education and consumption, amongst others. Recently, this property, called attribute decomposition, has been extended to the multidimensional context. Makdissi, Sylla and Yazbeck (2013) , based on the rank-dependent approach, show that this decomposition property is matched when the health dimensions -which are categorical dimensions -are defined to be Boolean variables. This counting approach allows each dimension to be gauged in proportion to the overall amount of the socio-economic health inequality index and, at the same time, it involves a parameter for the intensity of health redistribution to be done. The idea of capturing the role of one or many dimensions will be of interest in what follows.
A second line of research has been devoted to the notion of risk. On the one hand, risk is associated with genes at birth as well as choices, also called risky behaviors, e.g. addictive habits, see Gakidou, Murray and Frenk (1999) . In this line of research, Le Clainche and Wittwer (2015) prove that students are inclined to support the health costs following from their risky choices. On the other hand, the notion of risk is analyzed in the context of equality of opportunity, as developed by Dworkin (1981) , Arneson (1989) , Cohen (1989) , Roemer (1998) , and Fleurbaey (2008) . In particular, several authors try to distinguish between the legitimate and the illegitimate causes of health inequalities, name separating the efforts and lifestyle associated with the notion of risky behaviors from the circumstances which are beyond an individual's control, associated with the notion of exogenous risks. For example, Trannoy, Tubeuf, Jusot and Devaux (2010) , investigate inequality of opportunity in health by analyzing the role of circumstances during childhood, such as family and social background. In the remainder of the paper, we will study the risk factors that are not under an individual's control -exogenous factors.
In this paper, the two aforementioned lines of research are combined. The aim is to provide a multidimensional socio-economic health inequality index, which depends on different health dimensions and also on one exogenous risk factor. The idea is to conceive an index that will reflect two very different attitudes of the decision-maker behind the veil of ignorance. The first one is the usual attitude towards inequality as embodied by the degree of aversion to inequality (see Yitzhaki, 1983) , i.e. the willingness of the social planner to operate redistributive policies toward less healthy people in order to alleviate overall inequality in a society. The second one is the degree of risk aversion of the social planner. The literature advocates, amongst others, the use of Yaari's (1987) dual social welfare function in order to involve different degrees of risk aversion in the analysis. In our approach, the degree of risk aversion is derived from the association between the health dimensions and the risk factor (considered as an additional dimension). Also, the risk aversion parameter allows the health dimensions to be properly aggregated, while the aggregation process is sensitive to the Boolean values inherent in the risk dimension.
The advantage of dealing with the proposed socio-economic health inequality indices is threefold. First, it allows a Boolean risk factor to be associated with other health dimensions (e.g. physical and mental ones). Second, the comparison of multidimensional health distributions relies on a simple graphical approach. Indeed, a stochastic dominance criterion provides a non-ambiguous ranking of health distributions including one risk factor. In this respect, the dominance rule is compatible with either risk neutrality, risk aversion, or extreme risk aversion. As a consequence, the social planner's attitudes to risk are captured for each order of stochastic dominance. Third, each order of stochastic dominance is properly associated to redistributive health actions (transfers) i.e. to the degree of inequality aversion of the social planner. Hence, the dominance rule depends simultaneously on two parameters, one parameter that represents risk aversion, and another parameter that embodies inequality aversion. Finally, this approach is a multidimensional extension of Yitzhaki's Gini indices (1983), for which it is possible to calibrate both inequality and risk aversions. This provides a two-parameter family of socio-economic health inequality indices.
On the basis of 1,610 Luxembourgish households, we apply our stochastic dominance rule by changing the exogenous risk factors and by comparing all possible multidimensional health distributions. We find, among a wide range of Boolean risk factors concerned with the parents' characteristics, that the most important exogenous risk factors explaining health inequality in Luxembourg are the nationality as well as the education level of the parents. This result is robust for risk averse as well as extreme risk averse decision makers, insofar it is concerned, they are inclined to perform health transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the family of rankdependent socio-economic health inequality indices is set out. In Section 3, the risk properties are presented and they are linked with risk neutrality and/or risk aversion. The stochastic dominance criterion associated with the family of two-parameter socio-economic health inequality indices is proposed in Section 4. An application is performed on Luxembourgish households in Section 5. Section 6 presents some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Health Inequality and Health Achievement
This section briefly summarizes the notations and definitions used in the paper.
Notations
Let y E be an equivalent income distribution such that F y E is its cumulative distribution function defined over [0, a] , where a is the maximum conceivable equivalent income. There are n individuals in the society, where n is a positive integer. The rank p of the individuals are issued from F y E , such that p ∈ [0, 1]. Following the literature on the counting approach for measuring poverty, see e.g. Alkire and Foster (2011), we adopt the counting approach to gauge inequalities in multidimensional health in line with Makdissi and Yazbeck's (2014) approach. Let H(p) := (h 1 (p), . . . , h K (p)) ∈ R K + be the information related to each dimension of health indexed by k ∈ {1, . . . , K} =: K for an individual at rank p of the equivalent income distribution, and where
The set of all possible health information (matrices) is denoted H. The n×K health information matrix is H ∈ H such that H = (h 1 , . . . , h K ) where h k denotes the kth column of H, whereas H(p) denotes a row of H for an individual at rank p. H −p denotes the health information matrix H without the row H(p) and [0] a matrix of zeros. This health information is derived from an identification function i.e. a threshold function τ k . The threshold τ k , for each dimension k, indicates for any given individual at rank p whether he falls below the threshold τ k , in which case the individual is considered 'deprived' in the health dimension k. Thus, the individual is counted 1 in dimension k, otherwise 0, which indicates that there is no 'deprivation' in the health dimension k:
2)
provides the K-dimensional situation of an individual at rank p of the equivalent income distribution, and Υ(H) a n × K Boolean matrix.
Definitions
In what follows, we define a normalized aggregator, a map φ, in order to aggregate their health dimensions for an individual at rank p. In welfare economics, the usual aggregator is the generalized mean introduced and axiomatized by Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (1981).
where 1 K denotes the K-dimensional vector of ones. Without loss of generality, one may impose that k θ k = 1, and so, ***
1 For instance Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) propose:
In this case, the normalized aggregator may be simply expressed as follows:
The aggregator φ α (H(p)) represents the average health achievement for an individual at rank p. The overall socio-economic health achievement index is then, in line with Yitzhaki's (1983) extended Gini indices. In this case, a twoparameter family of achievement indices can be obtained as follows:
If ν ≥ 2 the index displays health inequality aversion, whereas health inequality loving is obtained whenever ν ∈ (1, 2). If ν = 2 the well-known concentration index is deduced.
Definition 2.2 -Socio-economic health inequality indices -For all H ∈ H and µ φ(H) = 1 0 φ α (H(p))dp, the two-parameter family of socioeconomic health inequality indices is given by:
In what follows, the α parameter will be linked to the risk aversion of the social planner, which is derived from the association between the risk dimension and the health dimensions. The advantage of dealing with a twoparameter family of socio-economic health inequality measures, denoted in a generic manner from now on as {I} ν,α , is the possibility of capturing risk sensitive properties.
Index parametrization with risk sensitive properties
In this section, emphasis is put on the notion of risk. The different subsections describe the properties of {I} ν,α with respect to one risk factor. The last subsection explores another type of parametrization, one related to distributional purposes.
Boolean risk factor
We consider that within health information, one dimension represents a risk factor that may cause health failure. In the remainder, for ease of exposition, when comparing two health matrices H,H ∈ H we suppose without loss of generality that µ φ(H) = µ φ(H) .
3
Definition 3.1 -One-dimensional risk factor -For all distributions H ∈ H, the risk factor potentially correlated to the health dimensions is defined to be dimension K, by convention, such that ι(h K ) ≡ ι(h r ) ∈ {0, 1}, with ι(h r (p)) = 0 for an individual at rank p not affected by a risk factor and 1 otherwise. The set of health information is accordingly decomposed such
Although ι(h r ) could be a continuous function of many risk factors, we suppose without loss of generality that only one risk dimension is available. An option would be to consider that ι(h r ) itself depends on r Boolean risk factors such that r = 1, . . . , R with ι(h r ) = (ι(h r,1 ), . . . , ι(h r,R )) Θr αr , and where α r and Θ r are weights that are risk specific. Those different strategies of averaging risk factors will be discussed in the empirical section of the paper. For the properties developed below, it is just necessary to get a bounded risk factor included in [0,1]. For simplicity, it is assumed that ι(h r ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Risk neutrality and risk aversion
The first sensibility property is related to the usual union/intersection approach of the literature on multidimensional poverty, introduced by Atkinson (2003) . The union approach is the less demanding value judgment of the social planner in charge of the identification of healthy people across dimensions. It postulates that an individual has to be non healthy in all dimensions to be considered as non healthy. In other terms, an individual is considered as totally non healthy when
Suppose that an individual is healthy in at least one dimension, then there exists one dimension k ∈ K −r such that ι(h k (p)) = 0. In this respect, such an individual is judged to be totally healthy in the same manner as an individual who is healthy in all dimensions. In particular, if an individual is affected by a risk factor i.e. ι(h r (p)) = 1 then this dimension would actually be neutral. Formally, whenever α → 0, the risk neutrality implies that the individual is healthy if it is the case that ι(h r (p)) = 1:
The opposite property, the more demanding one, is known to be the intersection approach. Suppose that an individual is only deprived in the risk dimension. The decision maker is going to judge this person as totally non healthy, in the same manner as a person who is non healthy in all dimensions. In this case, the risk aversion is maximal since, for any given health state H −r (p) of an individual ranked p, the risk factor ι(h r (p)) = 1 will provide a non-healthy state. Formally, whenever α → ∞ (or α = ∞ by convention):
As a consequence, the α parameter enables to capture the preference of the social planner with respect to the health dimensions associated with one risk factor. 
The RN property displays the risk neutrality of the decision-maker. When the individuals are healthy in one dimension only, for any given risk level (0 or 1), the individual is considered healthy. On the other hand, to be considered non-healthy, the individuals must be non-healthy in all dimensions without any distinction between the risk factor and the other dimensions. The risk aversion property RA directly depends on the risk factor, which, ceteris paribus, decreases the individual health achievement.The extreme risk aversion view ERA is the intersection approach explained above. A non-healthy state is assigned to an individual exposed to a risk factor even if he is totally well-off in all health dimensions K −r .
As can be seen in Property 3.1, a clear separation is made between the health dimensions and the risk factor. It is noteworthy that this possibility is inherent to the generalized mean aggregator · Θ α , which is characterized by the additive separability axiom -see Blackorby et al. (1981) . However, this property is not incompatible with the design of the correlations between the risk factor and the other dimensions.
Correlation increasing risk
This degree of correlation, in a multidimensional framework, has to be studied through the prism of correlation increasing risk, introduced by Richard (1975) and formerly by Meyer (1972) in the unidimensional setting. This concept has been suitably used for multivariate measurement tools, known as correlation increasing switch, see e.g. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and under other names by Boland and Proschan (1988) , Tsui (1999) , and Seth (2013), amongst others. The idea underlying those concepts is to capture the interaction between the dimensions, their complementarity as well as their substitutability, in the same manner as the sensitivity towards risk discussed above. In particular, the parameter α may be connected to the degree of correlation between health dimensions.
Consider two persons, say for simplicity p 1 and p 2 , to denote the individuals at rank p 1 and p 2 , respectively. Suppose that p 1 receives the maximum achievement amount (denoted ∨) among all dimensions k ∈ K, including the risky one, between his situation and that of p 2 , and that in contrast, p 2 receives the minimum between their achievements (denoted ∧) across all dimensions. Actually, this correlation increasing risk aggravates the inequality between p 1 and p 2 while each individual situation appears to be smoother (all 0's for p 2 and all 1's for p 1 ). The inequality is more important because one individual would be non healthy in all dimensions and consequently would support the entire risk factor. If H denotes the health information after a correlation increasing risk, then:
The concept of correlation increasing risk relies on the idea that the decision maker would have the possibility of switching the risk level to which some individuals are exposed. In what follows, the set CIR denotes the set of all distributions H, H ∈ H for which a correlation increasing risk is applied such that
-with CIR being used indifferently as a set or a property label. In other terms, a pure permutation is made between the individuals ranked p 1 and p 2 . Also, the sequence of correlation increasing risk must be non void, which could occur if
Property 3.2 -Correlation Increasing Risk -CIR :
For all socio-economic health inequality indices I ν,α ∈ {I} ν,α , if ( H, H) ∈ CIR such that H is issued from H by a non-void correlation increasing risk between two individuals, then:
On this basis, it is possible to restrict the values of the α parameter thanks to CIR. 
Proof:
. Taking two individuals ranked p i and p j , if their rank after a CIR are denoted p i and p j respectively, then:
Since v(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] and since the equivalent income y E is by definition invariant to any CIR, then p i = p j = p i = p j , and so: Boland and Proschan (1988) and Tsui (1999) 
After simple algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that strict L-superadditivity is ensured whenever α > 1.
(ii) Consider a correlation increasing risk between two individuals p i and p j such that
(ii.a) From RN , there exists k ∈ K −r such that ι(h k (p)) = 0, then a contradiction arises:
(ii.b) Setting α = 1 in the RA case yields also a contradiction since,
(ii.c) Finally, following the conditions of ERA, let ι(h r (p i )) = 1 and ι(h r (p j )) = 0 such that Υ(
The previous results shows that CIR is relevant with risk aversion only, provided that α > 1 is not in the neighborhood of infinity.
5 Also, result (i) indicates that the analysis in terms of risk aversion is general since it can be done with a bounded variable ι(h k (p)) ∈ [0, 1] instead of a Boolean one Eq.(2.1). This means that the use of the threshold τ k can be relaxed.
Snowballing risk effect
Let us now investigate the snowballing risk effect by denoting φ α (H p (S)) the achievement of the agent at rank p being non healthy in some health dimensions represented by the set S ⊂ K −r . Consider that individual p 1 is endowed with |S| non healthy dimensions whereas individual p 2 is endowed with |R| non healthy dimensions such that |R| = |S| + 1 < |K|. Adding to each individual the same risk factor r could imply that the increase in the non-healthy situation of individual p 2 is deeper than p 1 . In such a case,
(3.12)
In the sequel, we will say that H is issued from H by a snowballing risk effect involving two persons p i and p j , if their health situations are described as above, that is, an additional risk factor is added to both p i and p j with H being associated with more non-healthy dimensions than H.
Property 3.3 -Snowballing Risk Effect -SRE :
For all socio-economic health inequality indices I ν,α ∈ {I} ν,α , if ( H, H) ∈ SRE such that H is issued from H by a snowballing risk effect involving two persons p i and p j , then:
This property is well-used in the field of cooperative game theory, i.e. convex games. It postulates that the risk factor provides an acceleration of the non-healthy state of an individual p i who is initially less healthy than another individual p j .
Lemma
Proof: (i) SRE implies that:
is twice differentiable. The last expression becomes, for δ ∈ [0, 1] and setting |R| = |S| + 1:
Now let x S := (x 1 , . . . , x |S| , 0, . . . , 0), x R := (x 1 , . . . , x |S| , x |R| , 0, . . . , 0) and let δ = x K → 0, thus dividing both sides of the last expression provides:
Since x R = x S + (0, . . . , 0, x |R| , 0, . . . , 0), then letting x |R| → 0 and dividing both sides of the previous expression by x |R| entails:
As in Lemma 3.1, the last condition is fulfilled whenever α > 1. In this respect, we obtain the same implications compared with CIR, i.e., strict L-superaddivity, so that SRE and CIR are equivalent whenever α > 1.
(ii) Points (a), (b) and (c) provide contradictions in the same manner as in Lemma 3.1 (ii.a), (ii.b) and (ii.c) since in those cases:
The last result comes as a surprise since the restriction α > 1 (with α that does not tend to ∞) allows for two apparently different properties to be matched, both CIR and SRE. However, nothing is said about extreme inequality aversion when α → ∞. In the sequel, we formalize this last property.
Critical risk level
Consider a distribution H ∈ H, such that 1 = ι(h r (p i )) = ι(h r (p j )) = 0, from which we derive two distributions H 1 and H 2 by focusing on two individuals p i and p j only. On the one hand, the former is derived from H such that the worst health dimensions faced by both p i and p j are gathered, in particular,
More precisely, H 1 is obtained from H by replacing individuals p i and p j by p ij defined above, with no change for the other individuals. On the other hand, the latter is given by the worst situation between individuals p i and p j , that is, the maximum (bad health) situation between p i and p j : 
This property is actually matched whenever the risk dimension r is associated with a critical risk level, such as irreversible diseases. Hence, in a given distribution H, replacing two individuals p i and p j by one virtual individual p ij who takes on all their non healthy dimensions (including the irreversible risk factor), or by one virtual individual who takes on their irreversible risk dimension only, yields, ceteris paribus, exactly the same socio-economic health inequality index. This is because the dimension associated with critical risk dominates the other ones. Consequently, for an individual ranked p affected by a critical risk factor, his bad health situation is maximum whatever the values of the other dimensions. This is in line with the property of extreme risk aversion ERA. However CRL is weaker than ERA, since ERA applies for matrices of zeros Υ(H −r ) and Υ(H −r ), whereas this is not systematically the case for the critical risk level property. The equivalence is given below.
Lemma 3.3
For all socio-economic health inequality indices I ν,α ∈ {I} ν,α , let (H 1 , H 2 ) ∈ CRL with p i = p j . Then, the two following statements are equivalent.
(i) I ν,α satisfies extreme risk aversion ERA.
(ii.a) I ν,α satisfies critical risk level CRL and, 
that is, setting x i := Υ(H(p j )) and x j := Υ(H(p j )), 
Then, setting θ K = 1 and choosing a distribution H issued from H such that Υ(H −r ) = [0] and ι(h r (p)) = 1, ι(h r (p)) = 0, then Eq.(3.22) implies that:
, which concludes the proof.
Finally, the socioeconomic health inequality indices are endowed with various attitudes to risk. The different properties are summarized in the following proposition. Though risk sensitivity is now captured by the α parameter, nothing has been said about distributional sensitivity, which is introduced and discussed in the next section.
Boolean Risk Factor and Stochastic Dominance Criteria
In this section, the interplay between the parameters ν and α is presented in order to figure out the class of measures {I} ν,α . Particularly, it shows the role of ν in determining the willingness of the social planner to perform health redistribution. Lastly, the result in terms of stochastic dominance is set out.
Distributional sensitivity
Distributional sensitivity may also be captured by the function v(p), which provides the behavior of the social planner with respect to health transfers between individuals at different rank levels, instead of looking for permutations between the situations of individuals. However, in the same manner, this kind of distributive sensitive principle enables one to choose whether the decision maker has to implement transfers towards non healthy people, towards very non healthy people, or to the most non healthy ones. Those transfers are actually well-documented in the literature. Aaberge (2009) shows, for Yaari's (1987) dual social welfare function, the conditions needed for respecting the s-th degree positional (income) transfer principle. When ν = 1, an exogenous manna for one person improves his welfare and the overall welfare therefore also increases. The principle of order 2 postulates that the overall welfare increases if a rich-to-poor transfer occurs between an income donor at rank p 1 and an income recipient at p 2 such that p 1 > p 2 . Those transfers are generalized in such a way that more weights are put on the lower income recipient insofar as s increases. Formally, in the case of health inequality indices, the property of ν-th degree of the positional transfer principle is captured when the weight function v(p) has derivatives that alternate in signs, see Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) . The social planner performs some health transfers between the individuals. The set of socioeconomic health inequality indices that respect the ν-th degree positional transfer principle is:
  
In order to deal with the generalized Gini indices of inequality the weight may be restricted to v(p) = ν(1−p) ν−1 , such that ν = s in order to respect the ν-th positional transfer principle for ν ≥ 2. In that case, the social planner is more and more inequality averse to the extent that s increases. On the contrary, he is inequality loving whenever ν ∈ (1, 2), or neutral to inequality if ν = 1. The sensitivity to risk and to inequality may be summarized in the following Figure 0 . Figure 0 exhibits a snapshot of two distributional types of sensitivities: inequality aversion (variations of ν) and risk aversion (variations of α). In this way, the parametrization of the socio-economic health inequality indices may be performed with respect to the different properties inherent to ν and α, that is, according to risk and inequality sensitivities. In the same manner, in Table  1 below, the properties and all possible parametrizations are summarized for the two-parameter family of socio-economic health inequality indices {I} ν,α . 
∅ : no particular property of risk (outlined in the paper)
Stochastic dominance result
In this section, we show that, without imposing any functional form on v(p), but taking recourse to a multidimensional socio-economic health inequality index I ν,α (H) ∈ Ω ν , we can derive a non-ambiguous ranking between health distributions. Contrary to the previous papers in the literature, see e.g. Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) or Mussard, Pi Alperin and Thireau (2016), we propose concentration curves, more precisely, achievement curves, which involve the risk attitude of the social planner. For that purpose, let us introduce the achievement curve of order (ν, α), with ν ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} and α > 0. Definition 4.1 -ν-Achievement curves -The achievement curve of order (1, α) is defined as, for all α > 0:
The (ν, α)-order achievement curve for any given ν ∈ {2, 3, . . .} and α > 0 is:
In proportion of the mean, the achievement curve of order (1, α) yields the health achievement of one individual at rank p of the population. The second-order achievement curve (2, α) provides the proportion p% of the population whose health achievement is no higher than A 2,α H (p). Accordingly, a dominance criterion between achievement curves yields a non-ambiguous ranking between health distributions (say H and G). As a result, when the curves do not cross, there is more (or less) inequality for all percentiles p ∈ [0, 1]. Also, this result is in line with the bidimensional parametrization highlighted in the previous section.
Theorem 4.1 For all socio-economic health inequality indices I ν,α (H) ∈ {I} ν,α such that I ν,α (H) ∈ Ω ν with ν ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, α > 0, and for two health distributions H and G, the two following statements are equivalent:
Proof: See the appendix.
Theorem 4.1 provides a non-ambiguous ranking for multidimensional health distributions with respect to various attitude to risk (neutrality α → 0, aversion α > 1, and extreme aversion α → ∞). However, the non-ambiguous ranking comes at a cost since the ν parametrization becomes discrete only. As a consequence, inequality loving (ν ∈ (1, 2) ) is not available. 6 The different dominance criteria and their link with the risk properties defined in Section 3 are itemized in Table 2 below. The analysis is focused on the individuals living in Luxembourg. After excluding all individuals with missing values on any of the variables used in our empirical analysis, our estimation sample includes 1,610 individuals aged 50 and older and their partners. Within this sample, 47% are males and 57% are over 65 years old.
Health dimensions
Synthetic indicators of health have been constructed following the methodology proposed by Pi Alperin (2016). These indicators aggregate nine single or composite dimensions reflecting different aspects of the mental and physical health status of the individuals (see Table 3 ). In particular, this methodology allows to relax the threshold τ k (from Eq. (2.1)), in order to allow different degrees of 'deprivation' for each dimension of health. Consequently, for each dimension there are healthy individuals, completely non healthy individuals and individuals characterized by different intensities of health failure.
7 More precisely, the synthetic scores are calculated as the weighted mean of the K dimensions of health. In order to determine the weight vector Θ, we use the 'equal weighting' scheme, for which each dimension of health has the same importance in the final score, that is, 1/K. The main idea behind this distinction is the fact that the health outcomes can be the consequence of circumstances that are beyond an individual's control, and autonomous choices which are within his/her control. In his article, Roemer (1995) recommends that society compensates only the cases where bad consequences are due to circumstances or brute luck. 9 In other words, these circumstances can be identified as exogenous risks that can increase inequalities in health, these inequalities that should be compensated.
Exogenous risk
In our empirical application four explanatory variables were assumed to be part of the individual's circumstances: the nationality of parents, the educational level of parents, the economic situation of the family during childhood and the longevity of parents. In particular, these variables have been selected as they are frequently used to measure childhood conditions circumstances that can have an influence in adults' health outcomes. For example, Deutsch, Pi Alperin and Silber (2016) show that in Luxembourg, the probability of having good health is higher among natives, the higher the educational level of the father, and for those who did not have financial difficulties when they were young. Jusot et al. (2013) use the longevity of parents as a proxy for parents' health.
The nationality of the mother and the father can be considered as a circumstance variable which can eventually impact on an individual's health status. This is especially important in Luxembourg since the countryrecords the largest share of immigrants in the European Union (European Commission, 2011). In particular, the variable nationality of the parents' set to 1 assigned to an individual for whom both parents are immigrants and to zero otherwise. Almost 65% of individuals have at least one parent with the Luxembourgish nationality.
As regard the educational level of each parent, a distinction was made between two categories: those who have either no education, a primary or a lower secondary education, and those who studied beyond high school. Subsequently, the education level of parents' risk factor is computed to be equal to 1 if both parents belong to the first group of no education, primary or lower secondary education. In contrast, if one of the parents studied beyond high school, then the risk value is equal to 0. Only 34,41% of the individuals have at least one of their parents who have further education.
The third variable included as individuals' circumstances was the economic situation of the family during childhood. Individuals were thus asked whether their family used to have financial difficulties when they were growing up, from birth to age 15 inclusive. This variable was assumed to take two values: for those who answered pretty well, or about average, the variable was equal to 0, while for those from poor families or families whose financial situation varied over time, the variable is equal to 1. This variable does not represent a risk for more than 75% of the population.
The last risk factor concerns the parent's longevity. Individuals in the survey report whether the parents are still alive at the time of the survey and their age at death if applicable. With this information the longevity risk factor was set up to be equal to one if at least one of the parents had short longevity (i.e. those who died younger than the life expectancy of their generation at birth) and equal to 0 for those individuals with both parents enjoying longevity. Only 16% of the population have one, or both of their parents, in the category short longevity.
Risk neutrality
If the decision maker is risk neutral, then for any given exogenous risk factor associated with the health dimensions, the socio-economic health inequality index remains the same. In other words, the (absolute) achievement curves remain (almost) invariant with respect to the considered risk factors. In that case, as can be seen in the following figures, the results are in conformity with the theoretical prediction.
More precisely, at the order 2 (ν = 2), it is possible to see that the achievement curve is close to the 45
• line, meaning that the socio-economic health inequality in the society is the lowest possible, i.e. the aggregated health information is equally distributed among the individuals of the society. Indeed, a risk neutral decision-maker considers an individual being non-healthy, if he is non-healthy in all dimensions -the union approach. In addition, at the order 2, the decision-maker respects the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (a Daltonean decision-maker), then he could operate health transfers even if he is risk neutral. This would be the case for the individuals being non-healthy in all dimensions including the risky one.
At the order 3 (ν = 3), the same remarks hold true and the risk factors cannot be distinguished since the decision maker is risk neutral. However, he is more inclined to perform redistribution towards non-healthy people, since Kolm's transfer principle is respected. Also, at the order 3, all the curves shift down, showing a higher aversion towards inequality. 
Risk aversion
There are different degrees of risk aversion ranging from a low risk aversion to an important one. This distinction can be made by imposing different values to the α parameter in Eq. (2.1), α going from 1 to infinity.
Figures 2a-2d show the results of imposing different values to α. On the one side, it is possible to see that the higher the value of α, the further the curves to the 45
• line are, showing that the more averse to risk is the decision-maker, more important is the impact of the risk factors on socioeconomic health inequalities. On the other side, we can see that the decisionmaker cannot proceed to a non-ambigous ranking of the health matrices associated with different types of exogenous risk factors. This is because the curves cross, so that a Daltonean decision-maker could not say with certainty whether the bad education of the parents or their nationality is the main cause of the non-healthy state of the individuals, implying a high socio-economic health inequality in the society. At the order 3 (ν = 3), the curves do not cross when the degree of risk aversion increases. A Kolm decision-maker, being risk averse, nonambiguously ranks the distribution with the nationality risk factor as the most unequal one followed by education, economic situation and longevity risk factors. In other words, among the different circumstances the agents do not control for, having both parents as immigrants constitutes the risk factor that most aggravates the overall level of inequality. 
Extreme risk aversion
Three different orders have been computed in the case of extreme risk aversion in order to have a clear distinction between the four risk factors. At the order 2 (ν = 2), the achievement curves cross and it becomes difficult to identify those risk factors that increase socio-economic health inequality. At the order 3 (ν = 3), the extreme aversion case identifies the economic situation as the riskiest factor followed by the longevity one. Nationality and education cannot be distinguished since the achievement curves cross at the order 3. At the order 4 (ν = 4), for a decision-maker that respects composite transfers, the health information matrix associated with the risk nationality provides a (4, α)-order achievement curve that slightly dominates that of the educational risk factor. In this respect, nationality is the most risky factor that contributes to the overall socio-economic health inequality in a society. 
Risk mixture
As mentioned in Section 3, the socio-economic health inequality indices may be computed with respect to a bounded risk factor h r (p) ∈ [0, 1], which can be defined as the mean of all risk factors (Risk mix). This variable is interesting because it enables the risky factors to be compared with a mean risk. In our paper, it allows the health information matrix associated with the nationality of the parents to be compared with the health information in which an average risk factor is introduced. Accordingly, this provides an idea about the deviation of the risk inherent to nationality with respect to the average of exogenous risks. The figures below depict the case of risk aversion (α = 40) and extreme risk aversion -in both figures, the two smoothed curves lying at the bottom are those of the order 3. At the order 2 (ν = 2), it seems that the health matrix with the nationality risk factor is the most unequal. However this result is ambiguous since the curves cross for a risk aversion of α = 40 but not for extreme risk aversion. The order 3 (ν = 3) asserts that the achievement curve associated with the average risk factor dominates the nationality one, in such a way that more socio-economic health inequality is recorded with the nationality risk factor. One principal debate in the literature on multidimensional poverty is the role and the intensity of the weight attached to each dimension. Thus, the selection of the weight vector Θ employed for the aggregation of the dimensions of health in our synthetic indicators is very important. As we have already explained, in our case, we use the equal weighting scheme in order to give the same importance to each single health dimension. However, other systems of weights take into account the intensity of the dimensions among the population (Cerioli and Zani, 1990) while others limit the influence of those dimensions that are highly correlated (Betti and Verma, 1998) . Specifically, Cerioli and Zani (1990) give a stronger weight to relatively rare dimensions:
whereh k is the arithmetic mean of the k-th health dimension (that is of the ι(h k (p)) over all p). The weight of any dimension of health proposed by Betti and Verma (1998) is defined as follows:
where θ a k only depends on the distribution of the k-th dimension, whereas θ b k depends on the correlation between k and the other dimensions. In particular, θ a k is determined by the coefficient of variation of ι(h i (p)),
The weights θ b k are computed as follows:
, where ρ k,k is Pearson's correlation coefficient between dimensions k and k and F (·) is an indicator function valued to be 1 if the expression in brackets is true and 0 otherwise. The parameter ρ H is a pre-determined cut-off correlation level between the two dimensions. 10 In other words, it separates high and low correlations. The term θ b k is the inverse of a measure of average correlation of dimension k with the others. The larger the average correlation with dimension k, the lower the resulting weight for that dimension.
As depicted in the figures below, we have computed the achievement curves using the three proposed weighting schemes: weight 1 is the equal weight (EW), weight 2 is Cerioli and Zani's weight (CZ), and weight 3 is Betti and Verma's weight (BV). In our approach, it is possible to see that the achievement curves are not sensitive to the three possible normalized weights Θ. It is noteworthy that, in the extreme aversion case, the weight vector is totally independent of the dimensions, so that the achievement curves are exactly the same for any given weight vector. 
Averaging the risk factors
In order to aggregate the risk factors into one single variable in the case of aversion risk (Eq. (2.5)), it is possible to alternatively use the EW, CZ and BV weighting schemes. Since the risk factors are constructed as Boolean variables, the variations of the achievement curves are very low, suggesting that the way of averaging has no impact on their curvature. As we can see for the aversion case (α = 40), the achievement curves are almost the same (and exactly the same for the neutrality and extreme cases). 
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Conclusion
The two-parameter family of socio-economic health inequality measures {I} ν,α allows risk and inequality to be captured in order to provide a non-ambiguous ranking of multidimensional health distributions. In other words, the social planner behind the veil of ignorance is endowed with a bidimensional view, which is necessary to apprehend the impact of risk factors (that agents do not control for) on the level of inequality in a society.
Further investigations may be done in this way, such as dealing with multiple risk factors, for instance. This could determine some priority in the redistribution to be made to the non healthy individuals affected by exogenous risk factors.
Finally, some applications could be done in order to compare the nature of different risk factors. Although, our study lays the emphasis on risks being circumstances, it would be informative to pay attention to risk under control. This would produce an evaluation and a comparison of the impact of these different risks on the overall level of inequality in the society.
Appendix A2 *Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks; Walking across a room; Bathing or showering; Eating, such as cutting up for your food; Getting in or out of bed; Using the toilet, including getting up or down; Using a map to figure out how to get around in a strange place; Preparing a hot meal; Shopping for groceries; Making telephone calls; Taking medications; Doing work around the house or garden; Managing money, such as paying bills and keeping track or expenses. 
